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Abstract 
 
A significant feature of firm behaviors in the 1990s has been the practice of 
outsourcing. From the view of outsourcing clients, the outsourcing decisions are 
always influenced by several factors, such as cost reduction, focus on core 
competency, strategic requirement and so on. This paper based on the theory of 
transaction cost and core competencies, through the introduction of decision model to 
illustrate three critical determinants for outsourcing decision. This paper applies 
qualitative analysis to explain three dimensions of the model: Assets specificity, Sunk 
costs and Core competencies. The case study of China Development Bank shows how 
firm makes the outsourcing decision according to three aspects in the model and its 
outcomes of outsourcing. Finally, summarize our results and try to give suggestions to 
government, outsourcing suppliers and clients. 
 
Key Words: Outsourcing decision, transaction cost, sunk cost, core competency  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on how do firms make the outsourcing decisions and deeply 
research into the determinants for outsourcing decision. Meanwhile, this paper pays 
attention to the potential outsourcing market in China and treats the Chinese company 
differently from the previous views, considering them more as outsourcers than 
outsourcing suppliers. Through the literature review, I will give a definition and 
classification to the term “outsourcing”; then analyze the factors that influence the 
outsourcing decisions from the transaction cost and companies’ core competence 
perspectives. A decision model will be introduced in my paper based on the previous 
literatures. A case study focuses on how companies solved outsourcing problem will 
be presented and analyzed according to my model.  
 
In 1990, C.K.Prahaoad & Gary.Hamel has written an article “The core competences of 
the corporation”. It was the first time that the term “outsourcing” is been used in the 
research and considered as a shortcut to a more competitive product. A most important 
background for companies to survive and be successful in the long run is to “improve 
their competitive advantage by implementing different concepts, of which outsourcing 
is one”1 Outsourcing can be simply considered as the companies search for the 
resources outside. Some companies treated outsourcing as a cost reduction concept 
and tried to externalize their non-core activities to outside partners in order to focus 
on their core competences. Gene M. Grossman (2003) describes that we live in an age 
of outsourcing. “Firms seem to be subcontracting an ever expanding set of activities, 
ranging from product design to assembly, from research and development to 
marketing, distribution and after-sales service”. He even uses Feenstra’s Barbie doll 
example to show the widely use and influence of outsourcing activities. The 
production of a perfect Barbie doll comes from the different countries around world: 
the components, raw material (plastic and hair) from Taiwan and Japan, conducts 
                                                        
1 Leif Enarsson, 2008, Outsourcing and Strategic sourcing. P. 18 
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assembly in Indonesia and Malaysia, moulds are introduced from U.S., the doll 
clothing is made in China and the accessories which are used in decorating the dolls 
come from U.S.2  
 
But the first question is which parts of activities are core activities and which parts are 
not core activities? The market environment is kept on changing as time goes by: 
whether the functions now they decide to keep in-house still worth a lot after a long 
period; whether the functions they decide to be outsourced would not become core 
competencies in the future? Hence, it is necessary for the decision makers to 
distinguish their activities from core to non-core before implementing their 
outsourcing decisions and the most important factor that decision makers consider a 
lot is the outsourcing decisions consequently varies from cost reduction to the 
strategic decision to create competitive advantages. 
1.1 The Definition of Outsourcing 
Outsourcing has involved in companies activities earlier than 1990. Its definition 
varies in different literatures according to the different business environments. 
Karsten B. Olsen (2006) defines outsourcing as “the relocation of jobs and processes 
to external providers regardless of the provider’s location”, he also mentions that “off 
shoring refers to the relocation of jobs and processes to any foreign country without 
distinguishing whether the provider is external or affiliated with the firm”3 He 
distinguishes the definitions related to outsourcing such as in sourcing, outsourcing 
and off shoring and mentions that although they are associated with each other, 
neither implies the other. Power and Desouza defines Sourcing is the act of 
transferring work from one entity to another and Outsourcing is the act of transferring 
the work to an external part. So the decision of outsourcing or not can be explained to 
whether to make or buy.4
                                                        
2 Gene M. Grossman, 2003, “Outsourcing in a Global Economy”, p. 1 
3 Karsten B. Olsen, 2006, “Productivity Impacts of off shoring and Outsourcing”, p. 7 
4 Power and Desouze, 2006, “The Outsourcing Handbook,” p. 3 
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1.2 The Phases of Outsourcing   
Deborah Swenson (2005) defines overseas outsourcing “is a component of the 
globalization process that has attracted particular concern as the public has become 
familiar with the idea that improvements in information technologies enable 
companies to reduce costs by outsourcing inputs and assembly from lower cost 
overseas location”5 While the employment problem is gradually induced by oversea 
outsourcing, Feentra and Hanson (1995) argue that such kind of outsourcing will 
contribute to the explanation of the widening wage gap in the U.S. and the reduction 
of employment for unskilled workers.6 On the other hand, Amiti and Wei (2004) 
provide evidence showing that the presumption of outsourcing job loss may be 
reversed if one also accounts for the simultaneous job gains associated with 
international “in sourcing7” 
 
Although different terms are used to describe the outsourcing process, they present 
various kinds of outsourcing with their own characteristics. The main phases refer to 
outsourcing are listed in the following: Contracting, subcontracting, off shoring, 
make-or buy and 3PL (Third Party Logistics)8
 
According to Enarsson, contracting is a manufacturer contracts a company in a 
foreign market to produce or assemble goods on its behalf. While consider the term 
subcontracting, people always confuse about these three words: subcontracting, 
outsourcing and make-or-buy decision. Subcontracting is often used in construction 
industry, contractors bid one part of the production or service to another company, so 
called subcontractors. It takes responsibility for monitoring and approving the work of 
subcontractors. Make-or-buy decision refers to the process that the companies make 
the decision of produce in house or outsourcing. Another term 3PL refers to the 
                                                        
5 Deborah Swenson, 2005, “Outsourcing Price Decisions: Evidence from U.S. 9802 Imports” 
6 Feentra R.C, & Hanson, 1995, “Foreign investment. Outsourcing and Relative Wages” , NBER Working Paper, 
5121, Cambridge, MA. 
7 Amiti and Wei, 2004, “Fear of Service outsourcing: Is it justified?” 
8 Leif Enarsson, 2008, Outsourcing and Strategic sourcing. P. 19 
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logistics activities which are provided by external providers and the term outsourcing 
can be used to any functions in the company. Consequently 3PL can be considered as 
a part of outsourcing activities while related to the logistics activities in the company. 
As mentioned above, the concept of outsourcing varies according to the different 
commodities and different processes; it is difficult to give a very clear definition to 
outsourcing because it almost covers all the functions in the company. Therefore, the 
simplest way for us to distinguish outsourcing from other corporate behaviors maybe 
a definition from Mark’s book: “No matter what you call it, it you are not doing 
something yourself, you are outsourcing”.9
1.3 Outsourcing in China 
Although almost all the activities in the company can be outsourced to the outside 
providers, the most popular outsourcing parts in China nowadays are Information 
Technology (ITO) and Business Process (BPO)10. Hence these two parts will be my 
paper’s focus. Just like the ever-changing environment, different outsourcing 
companies and clients have various definitions to ITO and BPO. Generally speaking, 
ITO refers to the outsourcing of IT processes, which includes the product and service 
related to IT such as the maintenance and management of database and software. BPO 
likewise has several explanations. According to Gartner’s report, BPO is “delegation 
of one or more business processes to external provider that, in turn, owns, 
administrates and manages the selected processes based on defined and measurable 
performance metrics”.11 In his definition, the business processes which are outsourced 
to external providers includes the function such as human resource management, 
finance and accounting, or in some professional domain such as the indemnity of 
insurance, accounts payable and receivable in banking. BPO occurs when a company 
takes an entire process and outsources it to some one else. For example, “Logistics 
Outsourcing where things like supply chain management, procurement, purchasing, 
                                                        
9 Marks G, 2005, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Successful Outsourcing, Alpha Corporation, Indianapolis. 
10 Accenture, 2008, “China Outsourcing Report”. 
11 Ravindra Datar, 2003, “BPO in Asia Pacific: An Emerging Opportunity” 
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e-business and all processes that require many steps and co-ordination with multiple 
parties are outsourced to other actors.” (Enarsson, p. 86) If we consider the whole 
software outsourcing industry as a pyramid, ITO is typically service-based in the 
bottom of pyramid. It is a vendor-driven market with its main objective being to 
reduce the cost of IT systems or site/data centers. BPO goes beyond that and lies in 
the top of the pyramid. It has to do with improving the performance, efficiency and 
productivity of a business. In order to have a more clear classification of ITO and 
BPO, I classify the terms related to ITO and BPO in Table 1.1 &1.2. 
 
According to the table, it can be seen clear that the differences between ITO and BPO. 
Most of the key core processes of a business require IT support; if you are executing 
logistic management or warehouse management or customer care, you may use IT 
system to support these systems. And its progresses is measured in IT cost saving. But 
BPO is focused on changing and improving your competitiveness in the market place, 
such that it will generate more revenues, more margins. With BPO, firms are looking 
to increase the overall productivity, efficiency and competitiveness of the outsourcing 
processes, which can result in huge gains.12
1.4 Determinants of Outsourcing 
Factors determining the outsourcing are explained from various angles in the previous 
literature. A great amount of research show that cost reduction is an essential factor 
determining the outsourcing decision. Henri L.F. de Groot(1998) suggests that 
“declining transaction cost are a crucial factor in explaining the observed increase in 
outsourcing”13. Through the model developed in the paper, author came to the 
conclusion that the motives for firms to engage in outsourcing are: transaction cost, 
exploitation of economies of scale, savings on wage and benefit payments, and 
strategic consideration, in which saving the transaction cost plays the most important 
role. Outsourcing is more likely when transaction costs are low. Grossman, 
                                                        
12 Graham Kemp, 2004, “Outsourcing Essentials : The ITO/BPO Connection. 
13 Henri L.F. de Groot, 1998, ”Macroeconomic Consequence of Outsourcing”  
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Helpman& Szeidl (2005) analyze the determinants based on economies of scale, state 
that it costs a lot for a single manufacturer to produce all the components of a 
complicated product, so they are outsource some parts of the product to outside 
providers in order to reduce the cost.14 Yuhong and Byiaj(2005) approve that the 
argument above is right after their survey focused on outsourcing. 75% of the 
surveyed companies agreed that the first reason for them to outsourcing is cost 
reduction; the other reasons are productivity increasing, low cost of labor force abroad 
and share partner’s advanced technology and information. But Jane C. Linder and 
Martin I. Cole (2002) consider that the effects of outsourcing go well beyond the cost 
saving, it has changed the way the business goes to market.15  
 
Some other authors hold different views, Fenxia Zhang and Jingjiang Liu (2005) 
summarize that off shoring is the final result of three effects: economics, technology 
and policy16 Spencer(2005) focus on the international outsourcing to lower cost 
countries such as China and India, through the enrichment of trade models, industrial 
organization and contract theory to explain that related foreign direct investment, 
incomplete contract and search for the best partner contribute a lot to outsourcing 
decision.17 Fei Chen (2005) sets America’s service outsourcing as an example to 
explain the motives of outsourcing from two aspects: external effects include 
technology, economics and market; internal motives include cost reduction and core 
competencies.18
 
This paper is organized as follows. The analytical framework is developed in the next 
section. Section 3 introduces several outsourcing decision models and outlines a new 
decision model based on the previous models Section 4 executes case study on BPO 
in China Development Bank concerning the determinants of outsourcing. Section 5 
                                                        
14 Grossman, Helpman& Szeidl, 2005, “Complementarities between Outsourcing and Foreign Sourcing”. 
15 Jane C. Linder, Martin I. Cole and Alvin L. Jacobson, 2002, “Business Transformation Through Outsourcing” 
16 Fenxia Zhang and Jingjiang Liu, 2005, “The Development of off shoring”. 
17 Barbara J. Spencer, 2005, “International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts” 
18 Fei Chen, 2005, “An Analysis on Driving Factors and Future Development Trends of Service Outsourcing: A 
demonstration of America’s Service Outsourcing”. 
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summarizes the findings and gives comments on the outsourcing decisions and future 
market in China. 
2. Analytical Framework 
The motives for company to engage in outsourcing are presented from several aspects 
before. This section develops transaction cost perspective and core competencies 
theory to analyze the determinants for outsourcing. 
2.1 Transaction Cost Perspective 
Coase tries to explain why firms emerge in the economy and study the determinants 
of the size of the firm in his famous article “The Nature of the Firm” in 1937. It is the 
first time term “transaction cost” has been used to explain the generation of the firm. 
He addresses that “there is a cost of using the price mechanism”19 He summarizes that 
transaction cost is a cost incurred during an economic exchange decision and defines 
“transaction cost” into two aspects: 1, the cost of discovering the relevant price and 
the cost of obtain the accurate market information. 2. “The cost of negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction” (Coase, 1937) which I 
conclude them to the bargaining cost. Thus a firm emerges in order to substitute the 
price mechanism and reduce the transaction cost. 
  
Then Williamson develops transaction cost analysis from several aspects: Based on 
Simon’s definition of “bounded rationality” which refers to human behavior that is 
“intended rational, but only limitedly so” ( Simon, 1961, p. xxiv), He extends the 
conventional assumption about economic agents and explains that they are not only 
guided by consideration of self-interest but opportunism, which includes “strategic 
manipulation of information or misrepresentation of intentions”( Williamson, 1975) 
He claims that “opportunism requires economic activity to be organized so that parties 
                                                        
19 Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica N. S. 386-405 [chapter 2 of this volume]. 
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who voluntarily carry out the terms of an agreement (contract) will not be injured by 
parties who fail to adhere to the contract” 20  and emphasize the emergence of 
opportunism increases the transaction cost. And in 1981, Williamson summaries the 
transaction cost into three dimensions, he describes the transactions are (1) 
information impactedness, (2) the frequency of the exchange, and (3) the degree to 
which durable, transaction-specific investments are required to realize least cost 
supply.21  Williamson states that assets specificity is one of the most important 
dimensions influencing the transactions. 
 
Asset specificity refers to the investment that is put into a particular transaction and 
considered owning a high value for this transaction but would not be “redeployable” 
(Williamson, 1985) for another transaction or just show little value to another 
transaction. In order to have a more detailed description, Williamson divided the asset 
Specificity into several types such as site specificity (e.g. a natural resource in the 
local environment, moveable with a high cost), physical asset specificity (e.g. special 
computer system design for a company), human asset specificity (e.g. learn a dialect 
from a rural area) and dedicated asset( Williamson, 1985). He also pointed out that 
transaction costs can be divided into ex ante and ex post types.22 On one hand, asset 
specificity can reduce the produce cost or increase the revenue in the future, so it may 
induce a complex ex ante incentive alignments; on the other hand, assets specificity 
remain the particular interests for at least one side or both sides in the transaction and 
form bilateral independence. Consequently it will leads to a complicated ex post 
structural influence. 
 
Uncertainty includes two types: general uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. It is 
due to the ever-changing in the market environment and lack of communication, “one 
decision maker having no way to finding out the concurrent decisions and plans made 
                                                        
20 “An Experimental Investigation of the Outsourcing Decision for Motor Carrier”, Transportation Journal, 1999 
21 James W. Gentry, Jack Schibrowsky. 1990. “Developments In Business Simulation & Experiential Exercises,” 
Volume 17. 
22 Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. “The Economic Institution of Capitalism,” Yale University p20. 
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by others”23that leads to the instability for both sides in the transaction. Williamson 
has emphasized the risk induced by behavioral uncertainly, namely one decision 
maker deliberately conceal and distort the information for some strategic purpose, it 
would not be known by others. (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1996) such kind of 
behavioral uncertainty may leads to information asymmetries and opportunism. 
“Parties have the chance to take advantage of the other party’s lack of relevant 
information,”24 To a complex transaction with high degree of uncertainty, it will 
introduce an increasing number of contingencies. The more contingencies occur, the 
more difficult and costly to construct and enforce the contracts. 
 
The frequency of transaction refers to the number of times the transactions between 
buyer and seller. And the transaction cost here is linear correlated with the scale 
economy issue (Williamson, 1985). Williamson quoted Adam Smith’s famous 
theorem “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market” and claimed that 
transaction will not adopt specialized structures as it comes with the high cost unless 
the cost can be justified. It depends on the two sides: 1, specialized structures with a 
great deal investment in asset specificity could bring huge benefits; 2, the cost of 
specialized structures could be covered by its utilization in other transaction. Hence 
for certain level of asset specificity, the greater the volumes of trade, the more likely 
the benefits of hierarchical governance exceed the costs and the hierarchical 
governance will be efficient only if the frequency of transaction occur at a high 
degree. 
 
Under the transaction cost framework, outsourcing refers to the firm’s boundary 
change, functions transfer and rearrangement inside a firm. Davidow and Malone 
(1992) state that the global prevalent trend in business firms using outside service 
providers to perform the firm’s function would result in the “virtual corporation” with 
“well-defined structures” gradually lose their edges, and they also mention that such 
                                                        
23 Simon, Herbert A. 1957, “Models of Man,” New York: John Wiley& Sons. pp. 162- 63. 
24 “An Experimental Investigation of the Outsourcing Decision for Motor Carrier”, Transportation Journal, 1999,  
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kind of trend is necessary for the economic survival in America. But Peter and Tom 
(1991) claim that whether to outsourcing or produce in house must be “examined 
carefully for advantages and disadvantages. He is doubtful about the wide spread of 
“vertical deintegration” Carol and John (1999) analyze the different governance 
mechanisms substitute each other under the different impacts of transaction costs. 
 
When it refers to the methods applied in transaction cost research, some scholars tried 
to apply various methods such as econometrics and historical methods to explain the 
influences of transaction cost on outsourcing and vertical mergers. For example, 
Williamson used the quantitative case study to examine the franchise bidding for 
natural monopoly in CATV (Williamson, 1976) 25 . Levy studied the vertical 
integration in industries by using cross sectional econometric analysis. (Levy, 
1985)26But qualitative analysis still occupies the domain place in transaction cost 
research. As the three dimensions of transaction cost (assets specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency) are hard to measure with the database or financial statement. 
Researches based on transaction cost theory are always performed by surveys, face to 
face interviews and questionnaires. These methods can easily outline the transaction 
cost in the firms, but they still have some drawbacks. For example, after the survey in 
the firms, the feedbacks of the survey are gathered together to estimate the transaction 
costs in those firms. So the respondents and interviewers’ personal statements and 
bias may be contained in the survey data. Hence the results and conclusion may be not 
reliable and trustworthy. Another problem generates from the particular dimension of 
transaction—uncertainty. While the researcher conducts a survey, it is hard to have a 
fair comparison between the firms. As one firm finds it is uncertain to get the 
information of the production while another firm may have already occupy the market 
share of the same production and be sure of the environment of the production. 
Therefore it is difficult to affirm the indicators in the firms or compare them from firm 
                                                        
25 Williamson, Oliver E. 1976. "FranchiseBiddingforNaturalMonopolies-InGeneralandwithRespecttoCATV," 7 
Bell Journals of Economics 73-104. 
26 Levy, David. 1985. "The Transaction Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An Empirical Examination,"67 
Review of Economics and Statistics 438-45. 
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to firm.27
2.2 Core Competencies Theory 
Which kinds of activities in the firm could be outsourced are still surrounded in 
controversy. Most of the scholars hold the opinions that the firm’s core activities are 
not proper to be outsourced. (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Arnold, 2000) As outsourcing 
of the core activities may reduce the incentives in firm’s innovation, disclose of the 
critical technologies and increase the potential competitors, thus offset the benefits 
brought by outsourcing. Hence, the decision makers prefer to maintain the core 
activities and outsource the “disposable and core-distinct activities” (Arnold, 2000) to 
the external providers. 
 
Arnold develops a general outsourcing model to separate the firm’s activities and 
illustrate the whole procedure of outsourcing design. (See Fig. 2-1, Fig. 2-2): 
 
                   Fig.2-1 Outsourcing model 
As the figure shown above, four elements in the outsourcing model are outsourcing 
subject, object, partner and the whole design. Outsourcing subject refers to the 
economic institution which has to make outsourcing decision. Outsourcing object is 
the process and productions. All the activities in the firm are distinguished by four 
                                                        
27 Howard A. Shelanski, Peter G. Klein. 1995. “Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and 
Assessment,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, p.6 
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levels. The most important level is company core which refers to the crucial activities 
in a firm. Then the activities importance gradually decline with different kinds of 
activities. The last level is the activities with general availabilities.28
 
Engaging in outsourcing here is more or less a way helps firm to “transfer its decision 
rights and accountability”29 to vendor and let the client to pay more attention to its 
core competencies. While the firm outsources its activities to the vendor, it also helps 
the firm to connect with the core competency of the vendor and share the information 
and knowledge with each other. The focus of outsourcing in recent years has been 
changed, not only for cost economies but also a strategic decision looking for 
“business partner who can contribute to the strategic efforts of the company by 
providing it with expertise and competencies that are not found in-house,”30
                                                        
28 Ulli Arnold, 2000, “New Dimensions of Outsourcing: A Combination of Transaction Cost 
of Outsourcing: A Combination of Transaction Cost Economics and the Core Competencies Concept,” European 
Journal of Purchasing & Supply, Management, pp. 23-29 
29 Power, Desouza, Bonifazi, 2006, “The Outsourcing Handbook,” p. 9 
30 Power, Desouza, Bonifazi, 2006, “The Outsourcing Handbook,” p. 9 
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 Figure 2-2 Model for the outsourcing design 
Source: Arnold, 2000 
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3. Strategic Decisions on Outsourcing and Models 
3.1. Outsourcing Object from a Transaction Cost Perspective 
Coase(1937) claims that firms and markets are alternative governance structures that 
differ in their transaction cost and emphasizes that under certain condition, the cost of 
conducting economic exchange in the market is higher than conducting the same 
transaction within the firm. “Transaction cost are the ‘costs of running the system’ and 
include such ex ante costs as drafting and negotiating contracts and such ex post costs 
as monitoring and enforcing agreements,”31Based on Coase’s theory, Williamson 
develops the third type- hybrid governance structure, which includes outsourcing and 
other intermediate forms of governance. All these governance structures are aimed at 
performing the transaction with the lowest costs. Therefore, we should first look into 
the different kinds of transaction cost, then finding the most appropriate governance 
structures. Transaction costs may arise from information asymmetry, bounded 
rationality and opportunism as I summarized in the section 2. It also generated from 
activities such as evaluating suppliers, negotiation, and control function and so on. 
(Picot, 1991) Aric and Heide summarize the transaction costs which are directly 
related to asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty as 
the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 Aric Rindfleisch & Jan. Heide, 1997, “Transaction cost analysis: past, present, and future applications,” The 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 30-54 
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 Asset Specificity Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Behavioral 
Uncertainty 
A. Source of 
Transaction Costs 
 
Nature of Governance 
Problem 
Safeguarding Adaption Performance 
Evaluation 
B. Type of 
Transaction Costs 
 
Costs of crafting 
safeguards 
Communication, 
negotiation, and 
coordination costs 
Screening and 
selection costs 
(ex ante) 
 
 
Direct Costs 
  Measurement costs 
(ex post) 
Failure to invest in 
productive assets 
adaptation; 
Failure to adapt 
Failure to identify 
appropriate partners 
(ex ante) 
 
 
 
Opportunity Costs   Productivity losses 
through effort 
adjustments 
(ex post) 
Fig. 3-1 Source and Types of Transaction Costs 
Source: Aric Rindfleisch & Jan. Heide, 1997 
 
The cost of safeguarding comes from the asset specificity of the transaction. As the 
firms deploy the specific asset, they face the problem of their partner may exploit 
these specific assets, therefore the safeguarding problem is induced by the 
opportunism and assets specificity. And “Transaction cost analysis proposes that, 
because of opportunistic behavior of trading partners, high levels of asset specificity 
increase the costs of safeguarding contractual agreements.”32  
 
Environmental uncertainty refers to “unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990, p. 82) It is hard to 
measure it in the reality, as it appears the complexity and unpredictability of the 
environment, indicators for the environmental uncertainty are difficult to find. The 
adaption problem actually is caused by bounded rationality and environmental 
                                                        
32 Aric Rindfleisch & Jan. Heide, 1997, “Transaction cost analysis: past, present, and future applications,” The 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 61, No. 4, p. 16 
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uncertainty which refers to the situation that decision makers in the firms are difficult 
to adjust the contractual agreement according to the changing external environment. 
Thus the adaption problem comes form these two reasons. According to the 
transaction cost analysis, the transaction costs are increased by the high level of 
environmental uncertainty, especially to the ex ante costs of developing and exchange 
relationship (Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson 1994). Williamson presents that firms 
prefer to minimize their transaction cost through vertical integration when they face 
uncertainty environment (1985). 
 
Behavioral uncertainty and the bounded rationality have induced the cost of 
performance evaluation, which describes the decision maker is hard to assess the 
contractual compliance of its exchange partners because of bounded rationality. 
Always “the true level of performance is not readily apparent, direct measure costs 
may need to be incurred.”33
3.1.1 Dimension of asset specificity 
According to TCA (transaction cost analysis), outsourcing decision is often simplified 
to make-or-buy decision, but actually it is the comparison among three types of 
governance structures: market, hierarchies, and hybrid. The basic idea to develop the 
most suitable model for outsourcing decision is to find a governance structure with 
the lowest costs for each transaction unit. 
 
As Commons (1925; 1934) considers the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and 
emphasis that (Williamson, 1983; 1985; 1989) assets specificity as the most important 
dimension of three, I would like to analyze how the firm choose the governance 
structures according to various transaction environments: 
1. Objects with low assets specificity and low exchange frequency can be governed 
with market. That is searching for the goods and services in the free market. Low 
                                                        
33 Aric Rindfleisch & Jan. Heide, 1997, “Transaction cost analysis: past, present, and future applications,” The  
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 61, No. 4, p. 19 
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assets specificity means that little information should be exchanged before the 
transaction. The firm just need standardized goods, services and activities which has a 
great number of suppliers in the market that can form effective competitions thus to 
minimize the opportunism (Williamson, 1991). Meanwhile, “external outsourcing 
partners are able to bundle demand and to exploit economies of scale.”( Arnold, p.25)  
 
On the other hand, it is more reasonable to conduct the transactions with low 
frequency by market mechanism. As it could avoid sunk cost generated by using the 
internal resources and reduce the cost of inefficient organization in the firm.34Suppose 
that the goods with low asset specificity and exchange frequency are produced in 
house and governed by the hierarchies, it not only requires the costs of administration 
but also wastes the effective resources doing the useless production in order to 
achieve large scale effects, at the same time the more complexities of the production, 
the more costs will be increased by the produce. Therefore, bring the exchange to the 
market would be the most appropriate governance structure for the firms. 
 
2. Objects with high assets specificity, low degree of uncertainty and high exchange 
frequency. High assets specificity means that “much information has to be exchanged 
before, during and after the exchange of goods and services” (Arnold, p.25) It could 
be one party invests to some special domain or both parties invest together to some 
special equipment. If one party (as the supplier) has invested to the certain equipment 
or human resource, it will requires “bounding up with the other party” (Zhang Jianhua, 
p19), establishing long-term contracts to protect itself. And “It is not possible to 
realize large scale effects because only a few customers exist (or perhaps only one)” 
(Arnold, p. 25) Thus it needs the both sides of the transaction to establish a more 
stable relationship. 
 
Low degree of uncertainty includes the low uncertainty of environment and low 
behavioral uncertainty. The stable environment means the cost of unanticipated 
                                                        
34 Tang Jijun, 2005, “Firm’s Outsourcing Base on the Cost Perspective,” Jilin University 
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changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange could be reduced, namely it is 
easy and costless for the decision makers to adapt to a new environment and do the 
decisions. Low degree of behavioral uncertainty means the cost of performance 
evaluation decreases as less information asymmetry occurred in the market; hence it 
would be easier for the firm to establish the complete contract and perform it as the 
information are equal shared with all the suppliers in the market. 
 
Moreover, consider that the contracts are exchanged with a high frequency, the 
transaction costs: the costs of search information – searching for the firms which 
provide particular goods and services, the cost of negotiation, forming contracts and 
opportunism are relatively high if the transaction is governed only by market. 
Therefore, it makes sense to establish a hybrid governance structure such as formal 
co-working and cooperation, namely different forms of outsourcing. 
 
The relationship between both parties of outsourcing is neither like the character of 
market transaction nor hierarchies relationship: It is a weak locked relationship 
between buyer and seller, in which forms a long-term contract, willing to 
communicate, trust and rely on with each other. Then the more important point is that 
outsourcing meets the specialized requirements of buyer, not the standardized 
requirements in the market; outside suppliers provide goods and services with high 
assets specificity to the firms, sometimes maybe only one supplier could meet the 
demand of the buyer. Thus outsourcing such form of the hybrid governance structures 
fulfills the requirement of transaction: reducing the transaction cost from the 
uttermost point. Moreover, generally speaking, the outside supplier could realize large 
scale economies of the outsourcing objects and sell the goods to the firms with an 
even lower price. Therefore, the firms could not only reduce the transaction costs but 
also the production costs. Namely, taking the total costs into consideration, it maybe 
the best choice for firms to govern contracts by hybrid mechanism such as 
outsourcing. (Williamson, 1989,1991) 
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3. Objects with high assets specificity, high degree of uncertainty and high exchange 
frequency. Under such situation, hierarchies are the best governance structure for 
firms. “Hierarchies are based on the centralization of property rights by management. 
Administrative control mechanism within a company facilitates the orientation on one 
target.” (Williamson, 1985; Arnold, 1998) Generally speaking, little suppliers would 
like to run the risk of providing goods and services with high assets specificity and 
high degree of uncertainty. The complexities of outsourcing increases the uncertainty 
of establish, perform the contracts and information asymmetry. Meanwhile the high 
exchange frequency increases the costs of negotiations. It would be more difficult to 
perform a complicated contract which includes several times of negotiation and 
judges, opportunism will become an apparently serious problem. Consequently, the 
complexities of production will increase the probability of producing in-house. 
 
I summarize the three situations above: Outsourcing objects with low assets 
specificity, a great number of suppliers in the market could form effective 
competitions, so the firms could govern the objects with price mechanism (Markets); 
While objects with high assets specificity, the governance structure depends on the 
uncertainty of transaction and exchange frequency: transactions with uncertainty and 
occur with a high frequency, it is better to be governed by hierarchies; on the other 
hand, transactions in a relative stable environment and exchange occurred not so 
frequent, it is better to try a long-term relationship, namely outsourcing and strategic 
alliance.  
 
As the three situations illustrated above, comparing to Arnold (2000), he subdivides 
outsourcing into two types: internal outsourcing and external outsourcing and 
concludes objects with low specificity can be governed with an external outsourcing 
which includes a long-term relationship with suppliers or spot transaction. To this 
point, external outsourcing covers the range from hybrid forms to market. He 
emphasizes that goods or services with low specificity also can be governed by 
external outsourcing such as formal co-working and co-working without formal 
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agreement. But no matter how to subdivide the outsourcing activities, we can propose 
the hypothesis that “the intention to outsource is lower in the presence of asset 
specificity.”35
H1: the intention to outsource is lower in the presence of asset specificity 
3.1.2 Dimension of sunk cost   
As the first dimension illustrated above, asset specificity is an important consideration 
in outsourcing decision. But several scholars have stated that firms tend to ignore the 
transaction costs induced by asset specificity and “over engage” ( Roodhooft, Warlop, 
1999)  in outsourcing. They have suggested that the decision makers always prefer to 
outsource the activities as these people overemphasize production cost advantages and 
consider less of transaction cost. (Roodhooft, Warlop, 1999; Drtina, 1994; Lacity, 
Willcocks & Feeny, 1996) Another reason is that it is hard to calculate or value the 
transaction cost in their decision, therefore it is always judged by their personal 
preference. 
 
On the other hand, in most real life decision, the managers always sensitive to the 
sunk costs and under engage in outsourcing. Sunk cost occurred in outsourcing 
decision is a dynamic definition; it is sunk or not depends on whether the costs could 
be recovered during the outsourcing decision. Outsourcing is not only a make-or-buy 
decision here but also “involves a switch from internal production to external 
procurement.”(Roodhooft, Warlop, p. 364) Sunk cost occurs in internal production 
and it is natural that the managers should give up the corresponding assets which are 
related to the outsourcing decision. “If the managers are unable to ignore these sunk 
costs, they may engage in outsourcing to a lesser extent than would be normatively 
appropriate (Ghosh, 1995; Filip Roodhooft, Luk Warlop, 1999). Meanwhile, several 
cases (Garland & Newport, 1991; Drummond, 1994) show that the existence of prior 
investment affects a lot on make-or-buy decisions; the managers would be more 
                                                        
35 Filip Roodhooft, Luk Warlop, 1999, “On the role of sunk costs and asset specificity in outsourcing decisions: a 
research note,” Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999), pp. 363-369 
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reluctant to choose for outsourcing decision if the sunk cost exists and tend to “make” 
instead of “buy” activities. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: The existence of sunk costs may decrease the probability of outsourcing 
I supposed that most outsourcing decisions are influenced by sunk cost, but empirical 
research is little about it to my knowledge. Whyte (1994; Roodhoof, Warlop, 1999) 
found that sunk costs and asset specificity have the same influences on outsourcing 
decision as they increase the likelihood that the decision makers “decide to integrate 
vertically (outsourcing always be judged as a vertical de-integration decision) even if 
normative analysis would favor the preservation of the current governance structure.” 
And an opposite experiment has been conducted by Roodhoof and his mates as they 
study the influence of sunk cost on the decision to de-integrate. They classify the asset 
specificity to forward looking cost but sunk cost to backward looking investment 
which should not be taken into account of decision. They finally found that “both the 
asset specificity investments and the presence of sunk costs reduced the likelihood of 
outsourcing. (Roodhooft, Warlop, p. 367)” Svein Ulset uses 80 projects from 
Norwegian information technology industry to test three models which are derived 
from transaction cost economics and property rights theory. His result suggests that 
net benefit of R&D outsourcing is negatively affected by potential sunk cost. And his 
data also supports that strengthening his administrative control rights and switching to 
vertical integration as l last resort, the client can protect himself against the threat of 
costly recontracting of R&D projects with high sunk cost potentials.36
 
According to those previous literature researches on sunk costs, I propose several 
potential reasons for reluctance to engage in outsourcing: 
1. Path dependence of governance structures 
Path dependence in economics suggests that how the set of decisions one faces for 
any given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past even 
                                                        
36 Svein Ulset, 1996, “R&D outsourcing and contractual governance: An empirical study of commercial R&D 
projects,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 30 (1996) 63 – 82. 
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though the past circumstances may no longer be relevant.37Any governance structures 
can not exist without historical social environment, following the path in the past, the 
governance structures may enter into a benign circle or following the wrong path 
which may leads the governance structure to an ineffective circumstance, even lock in 
such circumstance and can not jump out of the vicious circle. It is ubiquitous in 
economic phenomenon such as outsourcing and mergers & acquisitions.  
 
First, outsourcing means that the reorganize of power and responsibility in a firm 
which requires the changes and reforms in an organization, especially large 
organizations. That results in the problem of organizational inertia. According to 
Porter’s “five forces” he has developed five types of inertia in organizations and 
illustrated that the larger the organization is, the more difficult to change it38. A 
distorted perception of outsourcing with a dulled motivation may always resist 
outsourcing decision as the most important motivational dampers are: direct costs of 
change, cannibalization costs, and cross-subsidy comforts.39 The changes brought by 
outsourcing may increases the potential risk of organizational failure, ineffective 
organize and sometimes involves the abandonment of costly sunk specific 
investments.  
 
Second, “the sunk costs in a decision may generate from information asymmetry 
within an organization.” 40  The managers in an organization who possess the 
information do not willing to share the information with other people, sometimes even 
distort the information which would favor outsourcing as it may threaten their own 
power base.  
 
Third, the sunk cost comes from the individual psychology of the decision maker. The 
                                                        
37 Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963), 2nd ed. Social Choice and Individual Values. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp. 
119-120 
38 Porter, M.E. (1991) "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy", Strategic Management Journal, 12 (Winter 
Special Issue), pp. 95-117 
39 Briefing Memo, “The Five Frictions: The sources of organizational inertia,” p.1 
40 Filip Roodhooft, Luk Warlop, 1999, “On the role of sunk costs and asset specificity in outsourcing decisions: a 
research note,” Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999), p. 365 
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managers who are responsible for the prior decisions making would be reluctant to 
make the outsourcing decisions. As it seems like a correct to the past decision or a 
compromise to the other members in the organization. The managers are always 
confident about their past decision or proud of their successful; therefore it is hard for 
them to denial themselves and cannot help to prevent the outsourcing decision. Thus 
leads to the unreasonable decisions making and sunk costs. The previous studies 
(Brockner, 1992; Chenhall & Morris, 1991; Staw, 1976) support this hypothesis and 
find that the decision makers are not immune to sunk cost on psychological aspect. 
 
2. The complementarily of governance structures 
The path dependence of governance structures is focused on the same governance 
structure analyzes its different performances; however, the complementarily of 
governance structures represents the relativity among various governance structures. 
The institutional complementarily indicates the governance structures of an individual 
transaction complements the other transactions or activities’ governance structures 
and altogether coheres with the whole governance structure in the firm at the same 
time section. These individual transactions in the governance structures influence and 
embed each other, any single structural change may affect the whole capabilities 
pooling. Hence, any single governance structures can not be easily changed without 
influencing other governance structures. 
 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) point out that firm exists as a balanced incentive and 
indicate that “all three instruments (pay for performance, asset ownership, task design) 
are complementary, namely using one of the instruments more intensively increases 
the marginal benefit of using the others more intensively.”41If we consider the firm as 
a hierarchical entity which switches input to output, the governance of input and the 
governance of output are complementary, thus we should think about the governance 
of output while we decide to outsourcing. Making such kinds of decision which is 
                                                        
41 Daniel F. Spulber, 1999, “Market Microstructure- Intermediaries and the theory of the firm,” Cambridge 
University Press, p. 296 
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related to the governance structure change in a firm may have great influence on how 
to govern the output, even to the whole capabilities pooling in a firm. As the upgrade 
of individual capability may requires the information complement and knowledge 
absorb, result in the all set of capabilities upgrade. However, different governance 
structures and capabilities corresponds to different adjust costs, namely different sunk 
costs, thus the complementarily of governance structures may postpone or withhold 
the outsourcing decisions.  
3.2 Outsourcing Objects from a Core Competence Perspective 
Asset specificity and sunk cost are two important dimensions from a strategic point of 
view, dimension of core competence aims at depicting a clear perception for 
outsourcing: which parts of activities is important to a firm and which parts are 
irrelative or useless to its core function that can be outsourced. Arnold (2000) uses the 
example of engine production and whether it is important to a car manufacturer to 
illustrate the core competences are varying according to the different strategic objects. 
“Micro Compact Car (MCC) does not build the engine for their smart car by 
themselves but has outsourced engineering and manufacturing totally to 
DaimlerChrysler.”(Arnold, p.25) Generally speaking, “companies with specific 
strengths in the marketplace, such as data storage or the development of accounting 
applications, can be said to have a core competency in that area.”(Whatls) It 
emphasizes the individuals who have the ability to perform a specific job. On the 
level of firm analysis, the core competence presents the firms which have the ability 
to develop additional products and gain its market share. Briefly, it is a company's 
basic business and area of greatest expertise.  
 
According to porter’s five forces model, he places the market, the competition, and 
the customer at the starting point of the strategy process, but Hamel and Prahalad 
(1990) hold the opposite point of view and state that in the long run, competitiveness 
generates from an ability to build a core competence, at lower cost and more speedily 
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than competitors42. Moreover, they develop three tests to judge a core competence: 
(Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad ) 
1. Provides potential access to a wide variety of markets. 
2. Makes a significant contribution to the benefits of the product as perceived by the 
customer. 
3. A core competence should be difficult for competitors to imitate.43
 
Combining the views from Homp (1997) and Hamel (1994), I develop two elements 
to distinguish a core competence: 
First, the firm’s businesses or activities must be unique in the eyes of the customers. It 
means that a competitive advantage, resources and know-how for the products. If 
firms can not distinguish themselves with other competitors in the market, they must 
make great influence on customers and make sure that the customers would like to 
choose their products at the first time; the best way that they can make profits is drop 
price. Just like IKEA, its unique value is modular design and innovation. It is focused 
on its core competences, and continually worked to build and reinforce them. It 
always sells goods with high quality at lower price than other manufacturers in the 
market and its products built up more and more of a market lead. 
 
Second, the core competence should have the potential to develop and reinforce. It 
means that competitive advantages can be put into several uses for multiple purposes, 
thus the costs of R&D and management can gain the optimal rewards. Meanwhile, it 
also emphasizes the potential to open other big markets in order to remain sustainable 
growth. 
 
The activities which possess the characters above should not be outsourced and must 
be treated as the core competences in the firm. And we can easily hypothesis that the 
more important of the activities, more likely it will be kept in house. Thus the third 
                                                        
42 Hamel and Prahalad, 1990, “The core competence of the corporation,” 
43 Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad, 1994, “Competing for the Future,” Harvard Business School.” 
 30
hypothesis is  
H3: activities with less importance increase the likelihood of outsourcing 
In fact, some famous companies in the world have already focused on their core 
competencies. Such as Dell Computers, It is a computer company but not physically 
manufacture computers. Its core competency is Supply chain management and Dell 
focuses on its core competency and acts as an integrator and managers of the 
computer manufacturing process. It forms a network between the various components 
suppliers and uses the information technologies to coordinate actions between 
manufactures so as to deliver computers to its customers.44 Other companies not only 
focus on their core competencies but also outsource their non-core activities or 
functions to outside suppliers. For example, NIKE, the biggest sports shoes 
manufacturer in the world, never produces a complete pair of shoes by itself. It 
assembles all the human resources, material resources, and financial resources 
together and concentrates to its two major functions: product design and marketing in 
order to strengthen its core competencies. On the other hand, its production function 
has been outsourced to the countries with lower cost labors such as China and 
Indonesia. The Boeing Company, the world’s famous aerospace and defense 
corporation, also the largest global aircraft manufacturer. But only produce cabin and 
wingtip by themselves and focus on the innovation and upgrading their technologies, 
transfer the components and parts to the lower labor cost countries.  
3.3 Other Drives for Outsourcing 
The three dimensions above separately from transaction cost perspective and core 
competency perspective to represent the drives for outsourcing. However, the drives 
for outsourcing various with firms’ objects, even time and market environment 
changing. A brief review of outsourcing drives will give us a clear notion. (Fig. 3-2) 
 
The most common reasons for firm’s outsourcing decision extract from this table: cost 
                                                        
44 Power, Desouza & Bonifazi, 2006, “The outsourcing handbook: how to implement a successful outsourcing 
process,” p. 42 
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reduction is identified as the most important drives for outsourcing. If there is a 
external source that the firm can use at a lower cost than produce it in house, it is a 
good choice for firms to outsourcing and achieve economies of scale of that products 
by a more professional supplier.45Hence in my model, the assets specificity is the first 
dimension refers to the cost reduction reason.  
Category Content 
Organizationally driven Improves effectiveness through focusing on core 
Increase flexibility 
Focuses on strategy 
Reorganizes the company 
Maintains “legacy” function 
Improvement driven Improves operating performance 
Acquires new skills/knowledge 
Acquires better management 
Acquires new ideas 
Improves ratio 
Financially driven Avoids investments 
Frees resources 
Generate cash by transferring assets 
Revenue driven Gains access to new markets and business 
Opportunities 
Accelerates and assists expansion 
Assists overflow situations 
Enhances credibility and image 
Cost driven Reduces costs through supplier’s performance and cost 
structure 
Turns fixed costs into variable costs 
Figure 3-2 Drives for outsourcing 
Source: Enarsson, 2006 
 
The reason of focus on the core competency can be strengthened by outsourcing 
activities, while the non-core activities in a firm can be transferred to a more 
professional expertise outside. On one hand, the firm can allocate more of the 
resources form the non-core activities to the core activities46; on the other hand, the 
                                                        
45 Heikkila J, Cordon C, 2002, Outsourcing: a core or non-core strategic managenment decision? Strategic Change. 
46 Gilley, Rasheed,2000, “ Making more by doing less: An analysis of putsourcing and its effects on firm 
performance,” Journal of Management, Vol. 26 
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firm can gain access to technology and performance that are world leading(Gilley, 
Rasheed, 2000) and update it in time which also resolve the problem of R&D costs on 
the supporting facilities. Thus I introduce the core competency as the second 
dimension of my model. 
 
The dimension of sunk cost is generated from the transaction cost view point. While 
the people always pay attention to the three dimensions of transaction: assets 
specificity, uncertainty of exchange and frequency. The analysis refers to the 
transaction cost and firm behaviors are explained from these three dimensions and 
overlook the influence of sunk costs. To some extent, the human behaviors are 
influenced more by psychological reason. Hence, a part of sunk costs can be 
concluded to human uncertainty. The rest explanations of sunk costs can be 
summarized to North’s institutional economics. According to these theories, sunk 
costs may be difficult to calculate in absolute value or find indicators to substitute, but 
it really exists and relevant to the human behaviors while they are making the 
decisions. Therefore, integrating sunk costs reason to the outsourcing decision model 
is necessary and considerable. 
3.4 The Decision Models 
3.4.1 Previous models 
Arnold integrates transaction cost economics with the core competence approach to 
develop an outsourcing decision model. Through three questions: Is the activities 
highly specific; is the activity strategically important; is the activity a core 
competency, a central part of competitive advantage? 47He may get an optimal 
outsourcing design. The model Arnold introduced is not only par attention to the 
shot-term influence of transaction cost economics (cost-based approach) but also add 
a long-term perspective by “strategic importance” as a quality of transaction. 
                                                        
47 Ulli Arnold, 2000, “New Dimensions of Outsourcing: A Combination of Transaction Cost Economics and the 
Core Competencies Concept,” European Journal of Purchasing & Supply, Management, p. 27 
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Although it just includes two dimensions and comparatively simple to the other 
models, its recommendations for the outsourcing decision are clear and compatible. 
(See Figure 3-2) 
 
Dornier et al uses a matrix to categorize the functions in a firm and try to find out 
which functions are strategic important. (Figure 3-3) 
         High 
NOVELTY 
(outsource/ in-house) 
Technology 
Quality 
Service 
PROPRIETARY 
(in-house) 
Technology 
Quality 
COMMODITY 
(outsource) 
Price 
UTILITY 
(outsource) 
Cooperation 
Service 
          Low                                        High 
Figure 3-3 Strategic importance and critical value 
Source: Dornier et al, 1998 
Its strategic importance is distinguished from two aspects: the vertical axis of this 
portfolio shows the strategic value of the part in isolation from high level to low level; 
the horizontal axis shows the critical value of the part in final assembly from high 
level to low level. This model just gives a general idea about which sourcing strategy 
is appropriate to the firm. It focuses on the product’s life cycle, as the time goes by, 
new product moves from the proprietary quadrant to the utility quadrant because of 
changes in technology; product in novelty quadrant moves to commodity quadrant 
because of price decrease and quality change. The model is good for evaluate the 
strategic importance and comparative advantages but it still overlook some important 
aspects such as assets specificity, market environment and risk evaluation. 
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Considered the three factors above, Lonsdale develops a risk management model for 
outsourcing in 1999. (Figure 3-4)48 The model is generally used to take managers 
through the need to retain those resources responsible for competitive advantage, the 
need to avoid monopolistic or oligopolistic supply markets and the need to manage 
the risk of post-contractual dependency. It takes into account the aspects of assets 
specificity and through its evaluation to asses the risk of dependency, and also 
considers a comparative supply market as a big background. Therefore, Core 
competencies or comparative advantages are his first consideration, market 
environment evaluation is the next factor, and finally the activities can be decided by 
assets specificity. 
Is the activity, resources or capacity responsible for competitive advantage? 
      YES                                    NO                                    
Keep in-house and develop                 Consider for outsourcing 
                                            
Is there a comparative supply market? 
                                    NO                  YES      
Consider carefully the balance between the potential benefits         outsourcing 
and the risk of outsourcing from this type of market. Only  
outsource if an in-house solution is impractical 
    
  To what extent is the activity, resource  
or capability asset-specific? 
                                  
                                   High          Medium         Low 
                               Keep in-house      Outsource and develop a 
bilateral contract or 
short-term contracts 
Figure 3-4 Risk management model for outsourcing 
Source: Lonsdale, 1999 
                                                        
48 Lonsdale C, 1999, “Effectively managing vertical supply relationships: a risk management model for 
outsourcing,” Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 4 
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3.4.2 The integrated model   
Neither in Dornier’s model nor in Lonsdale’s model have they included the factor of 
sunk cost. But as I mentioned above, under some certain situation, sunk costs may 
have great influences on most outsourcing decisions, even play a decision role in real 
life and managers may sensitive to it and appear abnormal under engage in 
outsourcing. So introducing the analysis of sunk cost, integrated with other two 
dimensions: assets specificity and core competency is essential to our outsourcing 
decisions in real life. ( Figure 3-5, Figure 3-6) 
 
 
Figure 3-5 a general decision model for outsourcing 
 
According to the figure above, we can divide the object into several situations and 
decide which object can be outsourced and which should produce in-house. 
1. Objects with low asset specificity and low sunk cost effects. 
Such kind of objects always represents the standardized goods, service and activities 
that need little information to be exchanged between buyer and seller. So the 
possibility for information asymmetry between both parties is comparatively lower 
than other situation. Low sunk cost effects delegates several cases: It may be easy for 
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the firm to communicate with the outside suppliers as the managers in the firm have 
the willing to share the information with the other people or the managers agree with 
the outsourcing decision as they may get considerable return from the outsourcing in 
the future. The second situation is the firm is fresh to the market. As the history for 
the firm is not so longer enough for the firm to form the business culture or the group 
of people who make the decisions can not depend on the previous experiences, thus 
these people may approve of the outsourcing decision. Take the third 
dimension—core competence into account, even if the object has a high core 
competency, it still worth to outsource to the outside suppliers. Because a great 
number of suppliers existing in the market that can form effective competition and 
minimize the opportunism, thus the firm does not need to worry about being limited 
by the supplier. Therefore it is better for a firm to outsource the objects to the outside 
suppliers. It’s not recommended to use the market mechanism to govern the object, it 
is appropriate to establish a long-term contract with the suppliers. On one hand, 
reducing the costs of negotiations and seeking for partners; on the other hand, it 
decreases the risk of exposing the core competitive activities in the market. 
 
2. Objects with low assets specificity and high sunk costs effects 
High sunk costs effects means that “the managers may have an incentive to with-hold 
or distort information that would favor outsourcing, thereby threatening their own 
power base within the organization.”49 Or the staff in the firm whose own interest 
may be influenced by the decision and represent uncertainty to the decision. So they 
may persuade the decision makers not to change the institutional arrangement in the 
organization and try to balance their current interest-base in the firm. Another 
situation is the managers will be reluctant to make a new decision as it may be 
considered as the correct to the former decisions. To some extent, it threatens the 
manager’s self esteem. Finally, it also represents the impediments generated from the 
organization. As the firm has formed a mature business culture with a lot of successful 
                                                        
49 F. Roodhooft, L. Warlop, 1999, “ On the role of sunk costs and asset specificity in outsourcing decisions: a 
research note,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, p. 365 
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managers. So a new decision is not easy to make at here as the firm prefer to follow 
the previous path and pick the same governance structure. Once a new decision such 
as outsourcing is be considered, it can be quickly denied by the big organizations 
which is confident with their capabilities and resources. Therefore, the objects can 
either be outsourced or produced in-house. It finally depends on whether it is a core 
competency. If it is a core competitive activity, the better choice is keeping it in-house 
because the more important it is, the higher sunk costs it will have. If it is a non-core 
activity, the effects of sunk cost may comparatively low, thus implementing 
outsourcing may be possible in such situation. 
 
3. Objects with high assets specificity and low sunk costs effects 
When a firm intends to make decision on the objects with such situation, they should 
carefully deal with the relationship between the outside suppliers. Once the suppliers 
have involved in the contract, the investments they made to support a particular 
transaction has a high value also the costs for these investments are relatively high 
than other investments as such transaction–specific assets are non-redeployable 
physical and human investments that are specialized and unique to a task 
( Williamson, 1975, 1985). As a result, the suppliers (the sellers) incline to be “tied 
in” in a two-way or multiple-way business relationship with the buyer. On the other 
hand, once the buyer holds up the seller, this relationship is bilateral (Joskow and 
klein, 1988) as the buyer is also locked-in this contract because the buyer gives up 
producing in-house and has exit cost associated with time and searching 
investment.50So the suppliers hold the specific assets. The buyer always needs to pay 
a higher price than the marginal cost because of bounded rationality and opportunists. 
Suppliers have the chance to increase the contract’s price as they own the specific 
assets. In this situation, the firm can take both own manufacturing and outsourcing 
into consideration. Whether to outsource or not depends on the nature of the objects. 
If the goods or service are core competence or highly relevant with core activities, it is 
                                                        
50 Joskow, P. L. "Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence", Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization (4), Spring 1988, pp. 95-117. 
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better for the firm to take hierarchical governance structure and produce the goods or 
service in-house. Through hiring the experts for specific activities to make sure the 
key technology can be kept in the firm. It also reduces the risk of management, 
opportunism and exchange uncertainty; on the other side strengthens the comparative 
advantages in the firm.  
 
If the goods or service are non-core activities or have little strategic importance, the 
firm can conduct turnkey outsourcing (Van Weele, 2005) with the outside suppliers. 
Turnkey outsourcing is “when the responsibility for the execution of the entire 
function belongs to the external supplier. The work for the external supplier does not 
then just include carrying out the activities, but also of coordinating them.”51And it 
can be concluded to hybrid governance structure. 
 
4. Objects with high assets specificity and high sunk cost effects 
The objects own such characters and highly relevant with firm’s core competency that 
should be governed by hierarchy without doubt. Moreover, the firm needs to focus on 
this core competency, heavily invest in its core technology and strengthen its 
comparative advantage in order to take up more market share from its competitors. If 
such kind of objects belongs to the supporting activities or activities with general 
availability, outsourcing and producing in-house both are fine to the firm. But the high 
sunk costs generated from outsourcing decision will effect the final decision a lot. 
Meanwhile as the results of high assets specificity, it always forms barriers for firms 
to entry. So the firm has to search for the suppliers in the market, namely they have to 
outsource its goods or service to suppliers. For example, most of the personal 
computer manufacturers in the world need to buy CPU from Intel Corporation or 
AMD. Another condition influences the outsourcing decision is a high sunk costs 
effects. Hence partial outsourcing may be a good choice for this situation. “Partial 
outsourcing means that only some parts of the company are outsourced, and the 
co-ordination of these functions is still controlled by the outsourcer.”(Van Weele, 
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2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6 different situations for outsourcing decisions 
4. Success in Outsourcing 
4.1 The Example of China Development Bank 
China development bank (CDB) is the largest policy bank and financial institution in 
China under the direct jurisdiction of the State Council. The bank provides financing 
for national projects such as infrastructure, basic industries, energy and 
transportation.52 Its core concept is doing what you are good at (core competency) 
and outsourcing of the rest. The bank’s operations includes loan operations, funding 
operations, treasury operations, investment & investment banking operations and 
financial cooperation with other supporting functions. Among which the credit 
operations, IT governance and development and other supporting functions have been 
outsourced to the other suppliers or financial institutions. 
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4.1.1 Increase the Core Competency 
China Development Bank was established in 1994 with headquarter in Beijing and no 
branches. At that time, all the loan businesses were outsourced to the four major state 
owned commercial banks. While CDB started its branches in 1999, it took over parts 
of the loan business and ran the business by itself. But it still outsources a big 
proportion of loan business to the commercial banks. 
 
On the other hand, Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) has essentially 
supported the business development in CDB. According to J.P. Morgan’s report about 
the electronic development in American commercial banking, it proposes a three-tier 
framework for bank’s information technology, namely M1, which refers to the 
hardware of computer system, system software, software tools, network management 
facilities and other supporting facilities in bank; M2, refers to application software 
and man-machine interface; M3 includes business process reengineering (BPR), 
strategic planning, system integration (SI) and maintenance management of the 
present system. It is clear that the profits brought by M1 and M2 are lower than the 
profits made by M3. In order to focus on the core competency and strengthen the 
comparative advantages, CDB decide to outsource the M1 and M2 and concentrate its 
limited resources to the development of M3. The details of the outsourcing activities 
can be found in the following table (Figure 4-1) 
Outsourcer  Supplier Function 
China Telecom The maintenance management of 
communication network infrastructures 
Hewlett Packard (China) Computer services, antivirus service, 
server service, 7*24 hours engine room 
watching service, data monitor platform 
service for key system, software 
management of desktop and the 
construction of anti-junk email system. 
Digital China The development and maintenance of the 
major operation system 
 
 
China 
Development 
Bank 
Global Data Solution Ltd The construction and maintenance of 
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disaster preparedness center (includes 
inter-city and intra-city) 
Figure 4-1 outsourcing services in CDB 
 
As the policy bank in China to funding large or medium people’s livelihood projects, 
CDB’s business partners are almost industries or famous corporations, the clients 
always require better IT services; moreover, CDB meets its rapid growth in business, 
the original technology is not compatible with the business growth. These two factors 
influence the daily operations in CDB and force it to consider about IT outsourcing. 
Another incentive for outsourcing is the bank creatively combines the business 
function with information technology function, finally generates an operation center. 
The establishment of operation center accelerates the IT outsourcing plan. Only two 
months later, Hewlett Packard (HP) China has become bank’s largest strategic 
outsourcing partner.  
 
CDB has obtained great benefits from its outsourcing with HP at its IT operation 
centre. It has been benefited a lot from its intensive outsourcing programme represent 
consistency with outsourcing decision model in my paper. And its outsourcing 
decision also can be explained by my model.  
 
First, CDB has outsourced its IT operation centre which shows high assets specificity. 
It is the base for functions operation in CDB which includes the infrastructures of IT 
system and data management. From computer software, hardware to store, protect and 
securely retrieve information. As the amount of businesses increase, the management 
of IT centre become complicated, especially like CDB such kind of policy bank, its 
clients are always firms with big size or governance institute. And the projects CDB 
processed are huger than other commercial firms. Hence, CDB needs to handle more 
complicated IT problems compared to other firms. The more businesses involved in 
IT centre, the more difficult to manage the IT centre, thus higher requirements of the 
professionals in IT department. But China Development Bank’s major objective as a 
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state financial institution is to issue loans to support national projects such as 
infrastructure, basic industries, energy and transportations.53It is not reasonable to put 
much human resource and time in solving the IT problems or invest in system 
upgrading. As the information technology is changed so fast that the bank needs to 
invest a lot if it wants to catch up with the latest technology. Therefore, IT operation 
centre can be considered as an object with high asset specificity. 
 
On the other hand, according to Arnold’s outsourcing model and his classification of 
outsourcing activities, IT operation centre belongs to the third level- core distinct 
activities (supporting activities) ( Arnold, 2000) So it is just a supporting function to 
CDB. It is necessary but not important related to the comparative advantages of bank, 
we can summarize it to non-core competency 
 
The final dimension for decision model is the degree of sunk costs. Generally 
speaking, the big organizations like commercial banks always include huge 
organizational inertia. As the banks always have complicated governance structures 
with thousands of local branches, so the changes in organization are likely to increase 
the risk of organizational failure, disrupts operations, and involves a great deal of 
expensive effort. And the outsourcing decision is likely to be hold up in these 
financial institutions. But the situation is different in CDB from three aspects: 
1.  CDB only has 32 branches and four representative offices throughout the country 
because it does not take private savings, and hence does not have many branches as 
other banks in China. It is the only bank in China whose governor is a full minister 
and debts issued by it are fully guaranteed by the central government of China. 
Therefore although it is a big organization, its governance structure is not as 
complicated as other banks. On the other hand, its primary responsible is to support 
the macroeconomic policies and strategic structural changes in the economy, so it 
functions with a clear object. Moreover, the new governor Chen Yuan took over the 
bank in 1998, and rearranges the organizational system in the bank, a new decision 
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maker always brings new decisions to an organization. That’s first reason why the 
bank decides to outsourcing after the integration of departments with little sunk costs. 
 
 
2.  As one of the most important financial institutions is China, CDB meets 
significant expansion in business but the development in information technology 
falling behind; it only has 30 staff in IT function and lasts for a long time. The 
investment in IT function is always not the focus in CDB. Even though the IT 
function has been outsourced to other suppliers, the sunk costs generated from IT 
facilities and human resource are not so significant.  
 
3.  The collaboration with small IT firms before the cooperation with HP. CDB has 
tried to build relationship with a little IT firms before their contracts with HP. The IT 
services are outsourcing to these small firms who lack the experience of providing 
high quality service and always be complained by the clients. It indirectly influences 
clients’ opinions on CDB. Meanwhile, different firms have various methods to resolve 
IT problems, the quality of their employee, the way they handle the problem, the 
attitudes they face the clients can not be unified. So CDB has wasted plenty of time 
and resources on tackling the clients’ complaints and conciliating the differences 
between suppliers. The cooperation with HP covers such expansion as HP is famous 
for its high quality service and it is an expertise in IT function which could do better 
with less money. Therefore, the HP as a supplier for outsourcing, to some extent, 
offset the sunk costs of previous collaboration. 
 
Three reasons above have explained why outsourcing to HP has low sunk costs effects. 
Summarize the three dimensions I illustrate at here, it is clear that why CDB choose 
“turnkey outsource” their IT operation centre to outside suppliers, especially to HP. 
 
After the outsourcing of loan, IT and logistics, CDB has experienced tremendous 
growth in profits and efficiency. While focusing on its core competency, the bank had 
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RMB 1.5 trillion in loans outstanding as the end of 2004 and became the most 
profitable bank in China, and the second most profitable bank in Asia. 
4.1.2 Strengthen the Planning of IT Outsourcing 
CDB is not simply outsourcing all the non-core activities, it attaches great important 
to the programming of IT outsourcing instead. It insists on developing its own IT 
advantages, planning the feasible outsourcing strategies and taking risk management 
into account. According to the researches on previous outsourcing cases, CDB finds 
two major problems existed in IT outsourcing: 1, except these four major outsourcing 
suppliers in the table 4.1, there are still lots of outside suppliers service for CDB. It 
brings the problem of coordination as though all the suppliers service for CDB, the 
aims and methods are various and lack of coordination; 2, the instability of members 
in the outsourcing activities has influenced the quality of outsourcing service. 
 
In order to solve these problems, CDB proposes to rearrange the outsourcing activities 
and pay attention to the risk management of outsourcing. First is to managing the risk 
of various suppliers. Choose the appropriate partners and establish long-term 
relationship with them which refers to the best way to improve the IT service 
quality.54Second point is managing the risk of over depending on the suppliers. Third 
is confirming the scale of outsourcing, namely make sure which activities can be 
outsourced and which can not be.  
 
Hence CDB has taken several effective measures to handle these risks: 
1.  Replanning of IT outsourcing activities. The planning office is established to 
resolve the problem of coordination. Any new IT service programs should be checked 
by “planning office” through two aspects: Does it have an advanced technology 
applied to service; does its business can meet the requirements of CDB, namely 
contribute to bank’s IT construction. 
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 2.  Establish an IT application development platform in order to introduce 
competition mechanism to the aspects of hardware, software and network. Thus to 
improve suppliers’ service quality. As hardware, software and network are the IT 
services with low specificity, the competition mechanism would benefits both the 
service quality and costs aspect. 
 
3.  Establish an e-buy platform. The present desktop system, laptops and servers in 
CDB are not possessed by CDB but it hires the facilities from other manufactures and 
then provides the facilities to suppliers. The plans of establishing an e-buy platform 
could introduce more suppliers into the competition. On one hand, it can support 
better service for bank’s business; on the other hand, the more competitions, and the 
better outsourcing management.55
 
4.  Improve the outsourcing contracts; establish specific assessment indicators for 
suppliers in order to form incentive mechanism and restrict their behaviors. 
CDB is the first bank in China’s banking industry that has outsourced its IT services 
and gain huge success from its effective management and specific object. It has a 
strong international advisory panel which includes Henry Kissinger, the former 
secretary of state in America. The suggestions that they proposed to CDB is a firm 
should focus on its core competency. As a result, at the very beginning of 
development, CDB has made the decision of outsourcing its IT services. We all know 
that the IT system will be complex as the business increases, CDB should focus on its 
banking operations, not IT construction. 
4.1.3 Clarify the Responsibilities between the Bank and Its Suppliers 
Although the IT services can be outsourced to the professional companies, the 
responsibilities can not be outsourced. Thus, clarify the responsibilities between the 
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bank itself and its suppliers and strengthen the administration of suppliers’ services 
are essential to bank’s outsourcing management. 
 
The administration of its suppliers almost depends on the contracts with them and 
daily maintenance management. The manager in CDB points out that outsourcing IT 
functions are not transferring the entire function to the suppliers, but the co-ordination 
of these functions is still controlled by the bank56. To some extent, it includes the 
characters of “turnkey outsourcing” in my decision model. 
4.1.4 Quantification of Outsourcing Risk 
Since the August in 2003, as CDB has signed a contract with HP, their contract is 
renewed every year. But the payment of contract conducts every three months after 
the evaluation of services in that period. In other words, if the service is overdue 
without any pay in, to some extent, it means the ending of cooperation. Once there is 
something wrong with bank’s information system, the supplier has no obligation for 
its maintenance. Of course, it is a rather low probability for this situation, no one in 
both parties would like to destroy the cooperation and trust relationship because of 
their own mistakes. But at the beginning of every outsourcing activity, it is a good 
way to quantize the risk by setting a time period for the contract. 
  
Considering the outside factors, it is essential for an outsoucer to choose a big firm 
with a good future as its supplier. Hence, in order to performing the outsourcing 
services better, HP has sent several employees working in headquarter of CDB. In 
five-workdays at the beginning of every season, the suppliers have to submit their 
working plans for the next season. And in the end of every season, they also need to 
summarize their performance and submit the work report to the operation centre. Such 
kinds of rules help CDB to restrict both parties of contracts and quantize the risk of 
outsourcing in a formal way. 
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4.1.5 Quantification of Working Quality 
CDB has a set of specific evaluation criterions to evaluate its suppliers. Generally 
speaking, it always conducts poll survey in the bank. If the supplier can not get the 
enough points after the survey, it will gain fewer bonuses than other suppliers. 
According to the evaluation criterions, the bank will assesses the suppliers every 
season and announce the assessment results thus to improving suppliers’ services 
quality on one hand, and giving references to the managers on the other hand. 
 
Because of the perfect performance of HP in the first contract, CDB had signed a new 
contract with HP from 2006 to 2009.57 According to the contract, HP will provides a 
completely long-term IT services for China Development Bank which includes onsite 
service, call-in centre service, equipment control and purchase, customer training, 
new technology consultation, outsourcing service management and facilities 
outsourcing service. 
 
Through the cooperation with HP, outsourcing projects have delivered more than one 
benefit to CDB: 
1.  Costs reduction 
The cooperation with HP is successful instead of bank’s previous collaborations with 
small companies. At the beginning of outsourcing, CDB outsources its IT service to 
some small companies, as the companies are small with low employee qualifications 
and lack of experiences. CDB has to devote plenty of time and money on complaints 
handling. But the cooperation with HP has solved such matters. The service quality 
and efficiency both increase with a high speed, meanwhile CDB does not need to 
waste unnecessary time and resources on integrating the small companies. To some 
extent, it has more resources and time for managing activities and focuses on the core 
activities. On the other hand, the long term relationship with HP can reduce the costs 
of searching for the next partners and adapting to a new collaboration relationship. 
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 2.  Service quality improvement 
From January 2005 to December 2005, HP’s onsite service team has solved the onsite 
problem for 16902 times, which includes system reinstalling 2280 times, problems 
with printer 3615 times, virus protection 1989 times, maintenance 997 times, other 
adjusting 776 times and other technological supports 7245 times, online guilds 4700 
times. 58The problems they are handling almost solved and no complaints received 
from clients. It not only proves HP has a high quality work team but also builds a nice 
image for CDB. 
 
3.  Access to new technologies 
The cooperation with HP has greatly changed the infrastructure in CDB, such as the 
laptop for every manager in CDB is the latest type of HP. Meanwhile, HP has created 
a new way for CDB to perform the upgrading. Not only the IT hardware have been 
upgraded, outsourcing leads CDB to access specialized knowledge and make use of 
HP‘s experience. Being up-to-date in all areas in a bank is simply not possible and 
would be expensive. So the cooperation can reduce the costs of upgrading and gain 
new techniques and tools from its partners. 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 BPO Trend in China 
CDB gains great successes by its outsourcing decision and sets a good example for 
firms in China to conduct strategic outsourcing. But it is just a successful example in 
ITO. As I said before, ITO is lying in the basic level of outsourcing; BPO refers to a 
more advanced level of outsourcing trend. According to Gartner Vendor Relation’s 
report on BPO in Asia Pacific, Asia Pacific Market grows the fastest around the 
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Global at 11.8% CAGR from $8 billion to $14 billion from 2002 to 2007. In which 
HR Services are the most outsourced and aggregation of HR outsourcing accelerates. 
Then Finance and Accounting Services follows but remains moderate.59Other aspects 
of BPO such as procurement, sales, customer care and marketing also shows an 
adoption trend. The overall BPO adoption rate in Asia Pacific is 40% but China & 
South Korea show lowest adoption. China is more like a global manufacturing factory 
than an outsourcing adoption country. As we can conclude the advantages of 
outsourcing from my outsourcing decision model: focus on core competence, better 
predictability and control over costs, improve service level and benefit from external 
technology and expertise. China plays a role more like an outsourcing services 
provider than an outsourcing services buyer. The reasons for China to be the 
outsourcing services provider are as follows: 
1.  Following China’s entry into WTO, the central government in China has 
gradually reduced the restrictions on international trades. China is gradually become 
the largest and latest potential market in the world. Its stable economic environment 
and policy incentives attract foreign investors to make long term investment at here. 
On one hand, to meet the local market demand; on the other hand, ensuring the 
manufacturing factories function in a stable economic environment with a rapid 
growth in economy. 
 
2.  China owns plenty of high quality human resource but its labor costs are much 
lower than other countries such as India and Mexico. Every year, more than three 
million students graduated from Chinese university, even over six million new 
graduates in 2009, but the employment rate is lower than 35%60. The oversupply of 
graduates leads to the lower requirement of their salaries. 
 
3.  China’s government inclines to unveil more incentive foreign investment policies 
and offer favorable services and infrastructure to attract foreign investors. Some 
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famous world manufacturing sites such as the Pearl River Delta and the Bohai Sea 
Belt of China have generated an aggregation effect and benefited the foreign investors 
a lot. Hence, some of the foreign investors are planning to enlarge their investments 
and sourcing in China. 
 
Three reasons above mostly influence China as a supplier country, and there are also 
other reasons why China shows lowest BPO adoption trend than other countries in 
Asia Pacific: 
1.  Chinese culture factor. In China running business, western investors always feel 
themselves like fishes out of water. As western culture value team work but Chinese 
refuse to cooperation even the people in the same firm or same group. They are very 
reluctant about sharing their own information with other people and consider the 
sharing as a loss to them unless they can gain some benefits from team work. 
Therefore, outsourcing the activities to the outside suppliers can be seen as privacy 
information in the firm leak out to other firms. Concerning about security and privacy 
factors, the firm will hesitate to outsourcing.  
 
2.  Costs Factor. Outsourcing in China has just taken off for several years, its market 
is immature and legal system is being improved. Meanwhile, “logistics service is still 
not a well-defined industry in China: different components of logistics services are 
under the jurisdiction of several different governmental departments.” (Enarsson, P. 
45) So most firms worry about costs going up substantially due to their outsourcing 
decision. In western countries, business is business and a personal relationship is just 
a personal relationship. But things different in China that business and personal 
relationship can be combined in most Chinese people’s eyes. So the costs of BPO may 
involve additional costs of handling the relationship with governors in various 
governmental departments. 
 
3.  Not familiar with outsourcing. Outsourcing, especially BPO involves various 
departments in a firm such as HR, F&A, transaction processing, and administrative 
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service. The complicated procedure in BPO and lack of appropriate service providers 
in the market lead to firms can not get familiar with BPO in a short time. Hence there 
is little business advantages so far as they can find from outsourcing.  
 
4.  In-house manufacturing and processing play an important role in China. China is 
often considered as an outsourcing services provider in global market because of its 
low labor cost and potential huge market. Thus in-house processes offer better 
competitive advantage at present. In-house processes also keep the power of control 
in a firm, so the managers in firms do not need to worry about control loss and their 
power-base influenced. 
These four points contribute a lot to Chinese firms’ refuse to outsource. 
5.2 Suggestions 
5.2.1 Suggestions to Chinese Government 
Concerning the present situation in China’s outsourcing industry, Chinese government 
should focus on how to strengthen the comparative advantages as an outsourcing 
supplier and accelerate Chinese firm to outsource on the other hand. First of all, it can 
issue new policies or give suggestions to local governments to encourage local firms 
involving into outsourcing activities. Set the successful outsourcing suppliers’ cases 
as examples to strengthen firms’ confidence in outsourcing. Meanwhile, create 
industrial values through the cooperation with global suppliers, in order to set 
examples in public. Then strengthening the education of outsourcing is another 
important point. People and firms not only need to know about what is outsourcing 
and what to be outsourced, but the questions of why to outsource is also needed to pay 
attention to. 
5.2.2 Suggestions to Outsourcing Service Suppliers 
Chinese outsourcing suppliers have paid much attention on manufacturing; their focus 
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should transfer to innovation and value creation. That’s the most important point for a 
firm to survive in competitive market. On the other hand, as suppliers, most of 
China’s clients are in western countries and USA. The culture gap may influence the 
communication between the suppliers and their clients. Thus bridge the culture gap is 
necessary for Chinese suppliers; deeply know what do the clients need and build 
collaboration relationship with the clients can result in huge rewards. 
5.2.3 Suggestions to Outsourcing Clients in China 
At present, the outsourcing clients in China takes up a small proportion of Chinese 
firms. Most of the firms still follow traditional way to process and manufacture and 
do not take outsourcing into account. Advices for Chinese firms are follows: 
1.  According to the decision model in this thesis, the first thing that the firm should 
do is distinguish its core competencies from other activities. With a clear object on 
which kinds of activities can gain more comparative advantages to firm and which 
kinds of activities should be outsourced. 
 
2.  Comparing the costs of in-house produce with outsourcing. Taking transaction 
costs and sunk costs both into consideration. There are two kinds of firms: firm A 
chooses a supplier and build long-term relationship with this supplier as it offers high 
quality of service but also requires higher price than other suppliers in the market. So 
firm A needs to pay higher price for the outsourcing; firm B keeps on trying different 
suppliers existed in the market in order to find the most suitable supplier. So firm B 
may needs to pay much higher transaction costs than firm A and most of these 
transaction costs are sunk, but its finally supplier may requires much lower price than 
firm A’s supplier. Hence, while the firm decides to outsource its activities, it must 
decide whether to be firm A or firm B. 
 
3.  Decrease the sunk costs generated in a firm. First the firm should try to decrease 
the organizational inertia as many as they can from several aspects: a clear perception 
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of outsourcing and a sharp motivation the take changes in the organization. People 
always adhere to the previous experiences, so persuade of these people may important 
for avoiding sunk costs. Namely, it emphasizes the communication with the staff in 
your firm. Without the staff or managers’ supports, the reforms in a firm are hard to 
implement. A quite nice communication environment can make the staff know better 
about what’s problem of present firm and its potential benefits after the reforms, thus 
reduce staff’s path dependence of governance structure. On the other hand, improve 
the information exchanges between different departments and different classes in a 
firm, thus to conciliate various opinions and finally decrease sunk costs. 
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